Cracks in the Great Wall: Signs the CCP is Moving to Oust Xi Jinping?

There have been some really interesting things coming out of China and an apparent/possible set of cracks appearing in the otherwise normally uniform front of the Chinese Communist Party and its General Secretary, and President. Such public cracks are unusual. But what do they mean? Where do they lead?

Well, let me speculate for a second on the potential ousting of Xi Jinping by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and what that might look like. There are both historical precedents in China and general trends seen in other autocratic regimes that can tell us what any potential ouster might look like. Here’s how the months or years leading up to such a dramatic shift might unfold:

1. Internal Dissent and Power Consolidation

• Signs of Discontent: Initially, there would be subtle signs of discontent among the party elites. This might manifest as more frequent leaks to foreign media or think tanks about internal disagreements, particularly focused on economic mismanagement, foreign policy blunders, or public discontent. I do believe this is where we are now, or soon.
• Formation of Factions: The CCP is known for its internal factions, and a significant power struggle might emerge between Xi’s loyalists and those pushing for change. Historical precedents like the fall of Lin Biao in 1971 or the ousting of Hua Guofeng in the late 1970s indicate that power struggles are often a mix of ideological disputes and personal rivalries. The undoing of some of Xi’s measures and personal protections could indicate to us the coming of voice to factions.

2. Economic and Social Unrest

• Increased Economic Instability: As Xi’s policies are increasingly blamed for economic troubles, there could be attempts to reverse some of his more controversial measures. The last thing the Party wants is to alienate its broad “Zhou Average” base, who are clearly widely and increasingly discontented with how the economy is going. If the economic situation worsens or public protests increase, this could be used as a pretext for Xi’s opponents to argue for a change in leadership. I think we already see signs of this. The Party will, IMO, side with the people.
• Policy Reversals: Expect to see a gradual rollback of some of Xi’s signature policies, such as the aggressive “zero-COVID” stance or strict regulatory crackdowns on tech and real estate sectors. Measures to solidify and consolidate his power will be looked at a second time. Any apparatus he has put in place for same will also be looked at and maybe repealed. The aim would be to stabilize the economy and reduce public dissatisfaction, framing these as necessary corrections rather than direct attacks on Xi’s leadership.

“It’s the economy, stupid”

3. Erosion of Xi’s Image

• Controlled Criticism: The CCP has a history of managing narratives, so you might see state media subtly shift from unqualified praise of Xi to more nuanced discussions that allow for indirect criticism. This could include acknowledging “policy missteps” without directly attributing them to Xi, setting the stage for a broader critique.
• Strategic Promotions and Demotions: Key positions within the military, security apparatus, and economic ministries would start to see a reshuffling. Xi loyalists might be side lined, while individuals known for their loyalty to the party’s broader interests, rather than to Xi personally, could be promoted.
• Fear of the Cult of Personality: The CCP, historically wary of concentrating too much power in the hands of one individual, has grown increasingly concerned about the cult of personality that has built up around Xi Jinping. This personal glorification not only threatens the collective leadership model that the party has long promoted but also risks alienating other powerful figures within the party. As a result, there may be a concerted effort to dismantle this cult of personality by downplaying Xi’s image in official media, revising or reversing initiatives closely associated with him, and reinforcing the narrative that the party, rather than any single leader, is the true source of China’s strength and stability.

“Us” not “Me”

4. The Trigger Event

• A Political or Economic Crisis: Historically, the final push to remove an autocrat often comes during a crisis — whether manufactured or real. In China’s case, this could be a severe economic downturn, a military standoff gone wrong, or an internal scandal that is too big to contain.
• Public Demonstrations of Loyalty to the Party: High-profile officials might start publicly affirming their loyalty to the CCP rather than to Xi, subtly signalling a shift. This could be accompanied by more vocal criticisms of policies directly associated with Xi.

“The People Not The President”

5. Leadership Transition

• Managed Transition: If Xi is ousted, the transition would likely be carefully managed to avoid instability. The CCP would present this as a collective decision to “correct course,” emphasising continuity and stability. Xi might be offered a face-saving retirement or a symbolic role, though his real power would be stripped.
• Emergence of a New Leader: A new leader would likely emerge from the ranks of the Politburo Standing Committee, someone with a reputation for being a stabilising force and possibly a reformer. This leader would need to balance the need for change with the preservation of party unity.

6. Post-Xi Era

• Policy Adjustments: Post-Xi, the new leadership might rapidly implement policy changes to reverse or mitigate the effects of Xi’s more controversial decisions, particularly in areas like economic management, foreign policy, and internal security.
• Reassertion of Collective Leadership: The CCP might emphasize a return to a more collective leadership model, reducing the concentration of power in a single individual, as seen in the post-Mao era under Deng Xiaoping.

Historical Comparisons:

• The Mao and Deng Years: After the catastrophic policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Mao — despite both his enormous cult of personality and personal consolidation of power — was gradually side-lined by party leaders who saw the need to stabilise the country. Deng Xiaoping’s rise in the late 1970s is an example of how the party can reassert control after a period of autocratic rule. These are both very interesting parallels where arguably the Party felt its own existence threatened largely because of an increasing alienation of its base constituency.
• Soviet Union (Khrushchev): Nikita Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 after years of internal criticism, largely due to his erratic policies and the Cuban Missile Crisis. His removal was framed as a necessary move for the stability of the state and was followed by a period of collective leadership under Brezhnev.

Conclusion:

If we are talking about the earliest signs of ouster, the CCP decides to move against Xi, it would likely follow a path of internal power consolidation, policy recalibration, and narrative control, leading to a carefully managed transition. The process would be gradual, with significant efforts to avoid the appearance of instability, and would aim to preserve the party’s ultimate authority while addressing the perceived failures of Xi’s leadership. I think we are pretty much now at the start of that road.

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